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Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, has called an informal meeting of EU 27 on 23 February
to discuss the EU's institutions. This will be the first time since 2014 that the leaders dedicate a whole
session to constitutional questions. It is their opportunity to assess the damage that Brexit has done to the
political mission of the Union, and to prepare for some important decisions later in the year about the future
of the European Parliament, the Commission and EU finances. Emmanuel Macron wants to promote "une
Europe souveraine" and has made a number of proposals to this end.
Composition of the Parliament
Top of the list of decisions is to re-apportion seats in the European Parliament in good time before the
elections in May 2019. The Treaty establishes that no state can have fewer than 6 seats or more than 96,
and that the composition of the House shall be degressively proportional (Article 14(2) TEU). 'Degressive
proportionality' is a good federalist principle that prevents the interests of the smaller states from being
swamped by the larger. Such a constraint is important in a Union where there are 186 times more Germans
than Maltese. 
The recent report of the Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) defines degressive
proportionality, somewhat laboriously, as follows:
Looking at the distribution of seats made at the last European elections in 2014, however, we find that the
degression principle was widely disrespected. In column 4 in the table below, we see that the countries that
find themselves disadvantaged by the current apportionment are France, Britain, Spain, Holland, Sweden,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia and Ireland.2
Aware of this deficiency, the Parliament and Council agreed to introduce a mathematical formula for the
distribution of seats which would cater in every mandate for technical adjustment to be made to reflect
demographic shifts, the churning of Europe's mobile population and the accession (and secession) of
"The ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State before rounding
to whole numbers shall vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each MEP
from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a less
populous Member State and, conversely, that the larger the population of a Member State, the
greater its entitlement to a larger number of seats".1
2member states. A team of mathematicians working at the invitation of Parliament devised what we call the
Cambridge Compromise (CamCom), a formula which would rectify anomalies in a politically neutral way.3
For illustrative purposes, in column 6 we show how this would affect each state if introduced at a stroke.4
1 2 3 4 5 6
Member States Population MEPs 2014 Ratio 2014 EP proposal CamCom
2017 (m) 2019
Germany 82.800 96 862.500 96 96
France 67.025 74 905.736 79 90
UK 65.809 73 895.085 - -
Italy 60.589 73 829.992 76 83
Spain 46.529 54 861.648 59 65
Poland 37.973 51 744.569 52 54
Romania 19.638 32 613.697 33 31
Netherlands 17.082 26 656.981 29 27
Belgium 11.366 21 541.229 21 20
Greece 10.757 21 512.252 21 19
Czechia 10.579 21 503.752 21 19
Portugal 10.310 21 490.933 21 19
Sweden 9.995 20 499.760 21 18
Hungary 9.798 21 466.552 21 18
Austria 8.773 18 487.383 19 17
Bulgaria 7.102 17 417.759 17 15
Denmark 5.749 13 442.215 14 13
Finland 5.503 13 423.331 14 12
Slovakia 5.435 13 418.100 14 12
Ireland 4.775 11 434.073 13 11
Croatia 4.154 11 377.655 12 11
Lithuania 2.848 11 258.900 11 9
Slovenia 2.066 8 258.238 8 8
Latvia 1.950 8 243.763 8 8
Estonia 1.316 6 219.267 7 7
Cyprus 855 6 142.467 6 7
Luxembourg 591 6 98.450 6 6
Malta 440 6 73.400 6 6
Total EU 511.805 751 681.498 705 701
When it came to the crunch, however, Parliament fought shy of proposing the mathematical formula that it
and the European Council had agreed in principle to adopt. This refusal is explained partly by the
unfamiliarity of most politicians with mathematics and partly by a rearguard action fought by those states
that are at present over-privileged in terms of seats, notably Italy, Hungary and Portugal. This is a pity.5 It
means that the unseemly bartering over seats will recur again in the next mandate as the Parliament
struggles to meet the criteria laid down in the Treaties. 
Uncertainty over the imminent departure of the UK from the Union gave MEPs both the excuse they needed
to prevaricate on the arithmetical formula and the opportunity to make some minimal adjustments to the
distribution of seats to iron out the worst of the inequities. The Brexit dividend is to free up 73 seats in 2019.
How Parliament proposes to use some of these vacated seats is shown in column 5. 
Article 14(2) TEU provides that the European Council adopts the decision on seat apportionment by
unanimity, "on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its consent". When they come next week
to consider Parliament's new proposal, is it too much to hope that the European Council will return to the
question of the formula? They may need to be reminded of their 2013 decision on the composition of the
Parliament to establish a "system which in future will make it possible, before each fresh election to the
European Parliament, to allocate the seats between Member States in an objective, fair, durable and
transparent way".6 The European Council should certainly undertake to guarantee the introduction of the
formula in good time for the 2024 elections.
Transnational lists
The second question before the leaders – promoted not least by President Macron – is the idea of
establishing a pan-European constituency from which a certain number of MEPs would be elected from
transnational lists. This idea has a long pedigree, supported by many academics and backed by most
federalists in the belief that the reform will increase voter turnout at the elections and strengthen the
legitimacy of the Parliament. Transnational lists would certainly Europeanise the elections which, to all
intents and purposes, have until now been separate national elections fought by national political parties
on national issues. Few national parties seem to have noticed that, at least in the more mature Western
democracies, the electorate is dissatisfied at the incapacity of Europe's old nation states to tackle modern
day problems. Nevertheless, while national party politics are tested and found wanting, European party
politics have not yet presented a real alternative. 
Although the large political families have long ago created EU level alliances of national parties, they are
really cosmetic, Potemkin-style parties – good for show, and at organising congresses, but hopeless at
electoral campaigning. Indeed, such are the absurd prohibitions on the activities of these European parties
that they must not spend money to support their notional candidates in the course of the European
Parliamentary election campaigns.7 The lively politics of the political groups in the Parliament are not
translated to the wider public domain. The European dimension of EU politics is obscured. Neither the
media nor the electorate is really made aware of the competing choices of personalities or policies that
divide the political families. 
The EU parties publish, fairly discreetly, common electoral programmes that are swiftly archived. Elected
MEPs owe next to no loyalty to the European political parties to which they are notionally attached: their
careers are subject solely to the decisions of their national political parties which themselves have little
vested interest in the success of their respective European family. 
The introduction of a pan-EU constituency, so its advocates argue, would electrify the elections to the
European Parliament. Each elector would be given a second ballot paper at their arrival at the polling station
in addition to the traditional ballot for their national or regional MEPs, thereby offering a real prize for EU
citizenship. In order to maximise appeal, candidates on the transnational lists would be selected by the EU
parties to reflect Europe's contemporary diversity in terms of gender, ethnicity and geography. The new-style
election would mark the coming of age of EU politics, creating that essential democratic sinew linking the
citizen to the exercise of power at the EU level and vice versa. The reform would put flesh on the bones of
the Lisbon treaty's definition of MEPs as being "representatives of the Union's citizens" (and not of their
states), and its assertion that "citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament".8
Nevertheless, as is evident, parliamentarians are congenitally disposed to loathe electoral reform. On 
7 February, by 368 votes to 274, the European Parliament voted down the AFCO proposal on transnational
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lists. Nationalist MEPs were naturally opposed to the initiative. The conservative European People's Party
(EPP) raised concerns about the introduction of two classes of MEP, and expressed fears that the EU level
political parties would not be able to campaign effectively against radical populist movements of
eurosceptic tendencies. 
In the end, only one recital of the original AFCO report is retained by the plenary that refers to the support
expressed by several states for the idea of a joint constituency. Those leaders known to be in favour of
transnational lists, in addition to President Macron, include those of Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg and Spain. And Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker will not be allowed to forget his
statement to Parliament in September 2017 that transnational lists will bring to Europe "democracy and
clarity". How the European Council deals with the matter on 23 February, however, is inextricably tied up
with its attitude to the election of Mr Juncker's eventual successor. 
Spitzenkandidaten
Back in 2014, too, the Parliament baulked at the proposal from AFCO to initiate transnational lists. By way
of compensation, the party groups in the Parliament decided to elect champions to lead their electoral
campaigns. This experiment worked to some extent in stirring up interest among the press, and in those
countries where the chosen 'Spitzenkandidaten' were able to campaign. (They were barred from the UK.)
The process came alive when Michel Barnier challenged Jean-Claude Juncker for the top job in the
European People's Party Congress in Dublin, in March 2014.9 Chancellor Angela Merkel, originally hostile
to the whole exercise, accepted the result – as did Mr Juncker, whose initial preference was thought to be
to succeed Herman Van Rompuy as President of the European Council. The rest is history. 
In June 2014 the European Council nominated Mr Juncker by 26 votes to 2. The next month he was
subsequently "elected" by the European Parliament, as the treaty so provides (Article 17(7) TEU).10 His
socialist rival Spitzenkandidat, Martin Schulz, became President of the Parliament. Although many claimed
the adventure a great success, others, including Mr Van Rompuy, harboured misgivings at the inversion of
the treaty procedure which charges the heads of government with the task of nominating the candidate (by
qualified majority) and gives to the Parliament the right merely to approve or reject the nomination (acting
by an absolute majority). The European Council agreed to return to the manner of choosing President
Juncker's successor in due course. The meeting on 23 February is it. 
The need to take another look at the Spitzenkandidat process is strengthened by the defeat of the proposal
for the pan-European constituency. While the champions chosen to head up transnational party lists in a
proper election campaign would have real credibility and authority, those chosen in the present
circumstances by the Potemkin parties as their frontrunners will be a pale shadow of genuine
Spitzenkandidaten. In order not to deceive the fairly sceptical electorate, it would be a mistake to
exaggerate the representative capability of these people. 
In 2014 it was simply agreed between the parties that the political group with the most seats after the
election would nominate its Spitzenkandidat as Commission president. The largest group turned out again
to be the EPP – but the EPP was still very much a minority group, with only 221 MEPs out of a total of 751.
This time around, the opposition parties have wised up to the risk that if they stick to the same
understanding as last time, there will in all probability be yet another Commission President from the EPP.
While one understands the desire of the EPP to hang on to the top jobs in the EU institutions, the resolution
passed by the Parliament in Strasbourg on 7 February modified its position from 2014 in order to avoid an
automatic assumption of power by the EPP.11 The MEPs now say, merely, that Parliament "will be ready to
reject any candidate in the investiture procedure of the President of the Commission who was not appointed
as a 'Spitzenkandidat' in the run-up to the European elections". 
Even that modification will not be enough to assuage the evident dislike of President Macron and others for
Parliament's bid to extend its constitutional role beyond the Treaty. Opposition to a repeat of the 2014
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experience is not just legalistic but also pragmatic. Serving heads of government with ambitions on the
European plane will not desert their national posts in order to lead campaigns at the European elections in
which they themselves are not, and realistically cannot be candidates.12 It can be in nobody's interest to
preclude the promotion of a good prime minister into the job of the Commission presidency. At the end of
the day what really matters is to find the best possible successor to Mr Juncker, and that choice will be
consensual between Parliament and Council. 
So what seems to be clear is that although the EU level political parties will be justified again in nominating
champions to front up their election campaigns, they would be foolish to assume that the European Council
will pick any one of those to become Commission president. On 23 February, the question might be posed
by the heads of government as to whether the Commission presidency is the right target for these
Spitzenkandidaten, or whether competition for senior posts in the Parliament would make for a more
credible alternative contest. Certainly the quality of leadership in the Parliament is an issue deserving of
more attention and, indeed, competition. 
Balance of power
The controversy surrounding the Spitzenkandidaten has a direct bearing on a more fundamental 
question, namely the future of the two presidencies of the Commission and European Council. 
Jean-Claude Juncker is known to be frustrated at his ambivalent position vis-à-vis Donald Tusk. In the EU
Treaties, as most recently revised by Lisbon, executive authority is deliberately shared between 
the Commission and Council, and there is no insistence on the clear separation of powers between
executive and legislature. 
Lisbon tried to delineate between the functions of the two presidents but it did not put in place a 
hierarchy between them, nor establish checks against the incursion on the prerogatives of the one 
by the other. The muddle is most evident in international affairs where an unhelpful distinction is drawn
between common foreign and security policy at summit level on the one hand, and everything 
else at all other levels, on the other. This is a direct hangover of the pillarisation of the European Union
between supranational and intergovernmental methods of working that had been entrenched in 
former treaties. The world looks on in amazement as both Mr Juncker and Mr Tusk turn up, 
alongside several EU national leaders, at meetings of the G7 and G20. If the two presidents disagree, 
there is an immediate political, even constitutional problem. Where the two agree, there is 
unnecessary (and costly) duplication. The division of powers between them is unclear both to the EU citizen
and to third countries. 
But is the answer to this clumsiness to merge the two posts? Mr Juncker favours such a merger, 
presumably hoping that the Commission President could steer the European Council effectively. But the
opposite dynamic could also come into play, as it has to a large extent with the High Representative on
foreign affairs and security policy who is also a Vice-President of the Commission and chair of the Council
of foreign affairs ministers. It is suspected that Federica Mogherini, through no fault of her own, is 
now a captive of the member states. A powerful President of the European Council also chairing the
Commission could easily reduce the Commission to little more than a secretariat, negating its prospective
role as the Union's federal executive. A fusion of the two presidents would have much wider implications
for EU governance than the mere blending of Articles 15(6) and 17(6) TEU, raising questions not least 
about the rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers and the autonomy of the Council as the second
chamber of the legislature. 
In any event, the refusal of the Parliament to have transnational lists coupled with the on-going dilemma
over the Spitzenkandidaten alerts one to another possibility: that the Commission President should in the
future be directly elected by universal suffrage. If the parliamentary route to the federalisation of EU politics
and the creation of real political parties is blocked, perhaps it is time to try the federal presidential route,
as the Americans did before us. 
5
6Shape and resources
Another question for the heads of government as they return to institutional matters must be the size of the
next Commission. Lisbon prescribed a college of only 18 members – that is, two-thirds of the number of states
– but by way of a feeble compromise, it also included a let-out clause, which was, of course, immediately
invoked (Article 17(5) TEU). I know nobody familiar with the working of the Commission who believes that
the Juncker college of 28 members has achieved new levels of cohesion or direction. A proposal to revert to
the Lisbon formula of a tighter Commission serving the common interest of the Union would be welcomed
by those who want the Union to develop in the federal direction, just as it will be opposed by those who
prefer to continue with a weaker executive body made up of national representatives. 
The informal European Council on 23 February is also supposed to talk about the next Multi-Annual
Financial Framework. It remains to be seen whether the European Parliament, so timid about constitutional
matters, can be a wee bit bolder when it comes to money. Heads of government may feel entitled to pay
no heed to hectoring from a Parliament that cannot reform itself, but they know that the Union's new
financial deal, including the creation of fresh sources of revenue, requires Parliament's endorsement. 
When it comes to EU financial reform, the default position is stagnation. This time, however, Brexit makes
sticking with the status quo intolerable. With the loss of the UK, the shape of the budget has to change. The
size of the EU budget has to grow in order to match the EU's new ambitions in security policy, its new
responsibilities over immigration, and the imperative to shore up the banking union as well as to insure
against the instability of the eurozone. In the long run, only the emergence of an EU treasury, grounded in
the Commission, raising revenue by taxation will save national treasuries money. 
Who governs Europe?
Behind the dilemma over finance, the balance between larger and smaller states, the Spitzenkandidat and
the dual presidency lies the deeper question of who in the long term is to govern the European Union. If
the choice is to go in the federal direction towards a Union enjoying its own sovereignty, executive authority
must be centralised in the supranational Commission. If confederal arrangements are preferred, and
sovereignty is anchored in the member states, the part-time intergovernmental body of the European
Council will find itself in charge.13 Neither the European Council nor the European Parliament is ready to
resolve that issue now: the best that can be hoped from the opening up of the debate is that the institutions
realise their limitations and determine to get better prepared for the next constitutional Convention than
they were, frankly, for the last Convention in 2002-03. As the next round of treaty amendment is likely to
come, for various reasons, during the upcoming mandate, there is no time to be wasted in its preparation.14
In the light of next year's elections, it is not too early for think-tanks and political parties to be reflecting on
these issues.15 As the European Parliament has just demonstrated by its own reluctance to embrace reform,
the EU institutions need enlightened prodding and cajoling.16 One hopes that President Tusk is well prepared
to manage the opening of the discussion among his peers about European governance and sovereignty. But
he cannot and does not have all the answers. One sensible outcome of the meeting next week might be the
convening of an independent group charged to reflect more fully on the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's
current constitution: it might even be invited to scope the mandate of the next Convention. 
Andrew Duff was a member of the constitutional Convention and one of Parliament's representatives at
the drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon. He is President of the Spinelli Group and a Visiting Fellow at the
European Policy Centre. His latest book, 'On Governing Europe: a federal experiment', is just published. 
The views expressed in this Discussion Paper are the sole responsibility of the author.
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